

John Tolan, Henry Laurens, & Gilles Veinstein. Europe and the Islamic World. (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press; 2012)

CHAPTER 3: The Social Inferiority of Religious Minorities – Dhimmis and Mudejars

Let us first consider how Muslim law defined the status of the dhimmi, or protected person.² Although the Qur'an does not clearly establish the legal framework for non-Muslims within the dār al-islām, it declares that the Muslim must not force the "peoples of the book" (ahl al-kitāb, the Jews and Christians) to convert. By contrast, he may oblige them to recognize the superiority and suzerainty of Muslim authority and to pay "humbly" the jizya, the capitulation tax (Qur'an 9:29). During the great conquests, the victorious Muslims gave guarantees to the conquered peoples, granting them far-reaching legal autonomy and freedom of worship. According to certain chroniclers, restrictions were sometimes among the conditions of surrender applied to the defeated Christians. This is apparent in the Pact of 'Umar, which, according to Muslim tradition, the second caliph, 'Umar ibn al-Khattab (634–644), imposed on the Christians of Syria. In fact, these restrictions were imposed gradually, throughout the first century A.H. (beginning in 622 C.E.), and expanded under 'Umar II (717–720).³ The first author to give us a full version of the Pact of 'Umar is the Andalusian traditionist al-Turtūshī (d. 1126) in his *Siraj al-mulūk*. In that text, the Christians of Syria send a missive to Caliph 'Umar to remind him of the pledge they made at the time of their surrender. They present a long list of prohibitions that they agreed to respect: on building new churches and monasteries, teaching the Qur'an, wearing "Muslim" clothing or turbans, bearing arms, and so on. A number of these measures were aimed at limiting or proscribing the public expression of Christianity. Hence the Christians pledged not to put crosses on their churches, not to display their scriptures in public, not to participate in certain public processions, not to pray in a noisy or ostentatious manner, not to ring their bells too loudly.⁴

2. The following section is based primarily on Antoine Fattal, *Le statut légal des non-musulmans en pays d'Islam* (Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 1958 and 1995); and Morabia, *Le Jihad dans l'Islam médiéval*, pp. 263–89.

3. *supra*. Fattal, *Statut légal*, pp. 60–69.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 62.

Historians call the Christians of al-Andalus "Mozarabs," a word that may be derived from the Arabic *must'arib*, meaning "Arabized."⁸ Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, historians inquired at length about them: How many were there at different times in the history of al-Andalus? How many had converted to Islam (and when)? Where and until when had their communities survived? The debate has sometimes been bitter because it is ideologically charged. For some nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Spanish historians, the Mozarabs represented the "true" Spaniards, forcibly subjected by the Muslim "outsider." The existence of the Mozarabs made it possible to justify the war as a reconquest (*reconquista*) waged by northern Christians to "liberate" their coreligionists from the yoke of Islam. For other historians, the near total disappearance of the Mozarabs before the thirteenth century demonstrated the widespread Arabization and Islamization of the peninsula; the invasion of men from the north was not a reconquest but quite simply a conquest. The lack of documentation has played a large role in the virulence of the debate, since historians are obliged to speculate.

What is certain is that the Mozarabs represented almost the totality of the population during the Muslim invasions of the eighth century, that they remained the majority for the rest of the eighth century, and that, by contrast, they were almost nonexistent by the mid-thirteenth century. If we are to believe Mikel de Epalza, their decline was rapid, less because of individual and voluntary conversions than for lack of ecclesiastical structures. In the absence of bishops and priests, the inhabitants of the rural zones of the peninsula were deprived of the essential sacraments of Christianity, especially

baptism. Within the space of a few generations, they could no longer remain Christians and were considered Muslims.⁹ The situation was different in large cities such as Toledo, Merida, Seville, and especially Cordova: there, the Umayyad authority maintained privileged relationships with the bishops and other prelates, often important figures in the court of the emirs (and later of the caliphs). For Christians, the presence of these prelates at court symbolized the Muslim authority's acceptance and reflected the universal power of the caliphs of Cordova (mirroring that of their predecessors in Damascus). A heavy tax burden fell on the dhimmis: it has been estimated that, in the mid- eighth century, a protected person had to pay the state about three and a half times what a Muslim owed.¹⁰ That burden helps explain the reactions of Christians, many of whom converted to Islam, emigrated to the Christian kingdoms to the north, or joined revolts against the Umayyad authority within Andalusian society.

Religious differences were only one factor in a society riven by ethnic and regional divisions— between southern Arabs, northern Arabs, Berbers, and muwalladun (autochthonous peoples who had converted to Islam). The emirs attempted to deal with the revolts produced by these divisions, even as they manipulated them to prevent united opposition to their power. They therefore cultivated personal relationships with each community, including the Christians. For a long time, Muslims and Christians were thrown together even in their main place of worship: they shared the Cathedral of Cordova until 'Abd al- Rahmān I (756– 788), judging the place too cramped, purchased the building from the Christians and allowed them to construct churches in the new neighborhoods of the capital.¹¹ That emir and his successors named a Christian “count” (comes in Latin; kumis in Arabic), an intermediary between the Christians and the sovereign, responsible for taxation and the justice system in the Christian community.

Christian notables had a presence at the caliphal court of 'Abd al- Rahmān in the tenth century: the caliph confirmed the nomination of bishops; and Christians served in the Umayyad administration, where they played an important role as ambassadors and translators in negotiations between Cordova and the Christian princes on both sides of the Pyrenees. The best- known example is no doubt that of Reccemundus, or Rabī b. Zayd: as indicated by his two different names, he, like a number of Mozarabs in the tenth century, lived between the Latin and Arab worlds. 'Abd al- Rahmān III sent him as an ambassador to both the Byzantine and the Germanic emperors. For his trouble, the envoy received the bishopric of Elvira from the caliph. It was apparently he who compiled the Calendar of Cordova in a bilingual (Latin and Arabic) version, dedicating it in 961 to the new caliph, al- Hakam II. But the Mozarabs of the caliphal period generally left few traces in the documentation or among the chroniclers.

For the period of the taifas (1031– 1090), the information about the Mozarabs is even rarer. The Christians who remained were increasingly Arabized: essential Christian texts were translated into Arabic for readers who no longer knew Latin. Those playing an important role in diplomacy or politics became rarer; with the disappearance of the caliphate, it seems, no emir felt the need to surround himself with representatives of the Christian community, whose political importance was minimal. By contrast, the presence of Christians within the taifas seems in general not to have provoked any anxiety. No one feared they might form an alliance with the harbīs (non- Muslim residents of the dār al- harb) to the north, who were becoming increasingly aggressive. This is particularly surprising when we realize that the Jews in certain taifas were sometimes accused of destabilizing the power structure, as was the case in Granada, where they were the victims of a massacre in 1066.

Under the Almoravids (1090– 1147), the situation of the dhimmis on the peninsula grew grimmer. For Yūsuf b. Tāshfīn and his followers, one of the fatal flaws of the petty kings of the taifas was precisely their lack of steadfastness in their relations with the Christians, dhimmis and harbīs. There could now be no question of making peace with the harbīs, much less of their paying parias. As for the dhimmis, it was necessary to limit and scale back their role in Andalusian society and minimize their contacts with

Muslims, while still respecting the rights that the Sharia granted them. Ibn 'Abdun's manual of hisba (urban law) reflected that new state of affairs: it specifies that no Muslim ought to do "lowly" tasks for a Jew or Christian— take care of his animals, dispose of his garbage, clean his latrines, and so on. It was the dhimmi who was to execute these tasks, which corresponded to his inferior status. Christians were morally inferior as well, according to Ibn 'Abdun: he advises prohibiting Christian women from going into churches except on days when mass is held, since it is well known, he says, that they go there to fornicate with the priests.¹²

8. On the meaning and pitfalls of the term "Mozarab," see Thomas Burman, *Religious Polemic and the Intellectual History of the Mozarabs*, c. 1050–1200 (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 1994), pp. 7–9; Mikel de Epalza, "Mozarabs: An Emblematic Christian Minority in al- Andalus," in *The Legacy of Muslim Spain*, ed. S. K. Jayyusi (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 1992), pp. 149–70; EI2, s.v. "Mozarab" (Pedro Chalmeta).

9. Mikel de Epalza, "Falta de obispos y conversión al Islam de los Cristianos de al Ándalus," *Al- Qantara* 15 (1994): 386–400.

10. EI2, s.v. "Mozarab."

11. Lévi- Provençal, *Histoire de l'Espagne musulmane*, vol. 1: 78–79.

12. Ibn 'Abdun, *Treatise of Hisba*, translated in Évariste Lévi- Provençal, *Séville musulmane au début du XIIe siècle: Le traité d'Ibn Abdun sur la vie urbaine et les corps de métiers* (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1947), pp. 108–9.

In 1099, Yūsuf b. Tāshfīn, on the advice of his ulemas, had the main church of Granada razed. Later, the Christians of the city appealed to the Aragonese king Alfonso I, who conducted a campaign of raids in Andalusia in 1125– 1126, bringing back a good number of Mozarabs with him to Aragon. The role played in that affair by the Christians of Granada led to the deportation of a fair number of Mozarabs to Morocco, where it would have been difficult for them to conspire with their northern coreligionists and where they could perform the function of collectors of non- Qur'anic taxes. Other Christians and Jews did not wait for these expulsions to leave al- Andalus: some departed for other, more tolerant Muslim countries. The Jewish philosopher Maimonides, for example, settled in Cairo. Others fled to Christian Spain, increasing the Jewish and Mozarab population in border cities such as Toledo. The repression of non- Muslims by the Almohads led to further mass departures of Christians and Jews. At the time of the taking of the chief Andalusian cities by Christian kings in the thirteenth century, there were almost no dhimmis left. The inhabitants of the Nasrid emirate of Granada were almost exclusively Muslim.

Wine could be a troublesome subject. Although at certain times and in certain parts of the dār al- islām, Muslims readily drank wine,¹⁷ this practice often provoked the wrath of jurists. A mufti from Cordova in the first half of the eighth century declared that the house of every wine merchant should be burned down.¹⁸ In the twelfth century, Ibn 'Abdun complained that Cordovan Muslims were crossing the Guadalquivir in boats at night, to go to the Christian neighborhood and buy wine. Ibn 'Abd al- Raūf recommended harsh punishments for the Muslim who drank wine and for the Christian who sold it to him, but also for the overzealous Muslim who tried to prevent the Christian from consuming it.¹⁹

17. See , s.v. "Khamr" (A. Wensicnk and J. Sadan); on the consumption of wine in Egypt, see Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society*, vol. 1: 122–23.

18. Vincent Lagardère, *Histoire et société en occident musulman au moyen âge: Analyse du Mi'yār d'al- Wanšārīsi* (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 1996), p. 52.

19. Ibn 'Abdun, *Treatise of Hisba*, Lévi- Provençal trans., pp. 64, 127–28; Arié, "Traduction annotée."

In Spain, every conquest led to large- scale emigration to territories still under Muslim control, especially Granada and the Maghreb, in accordance with the prescriptions of the Sharia, which discouraged the Muslim from living under the yoke of the infidel. But a good number of Muslims remained, and the kings did their best to encourage them, sometimes going so far as to establish new Muslim settlers in

underpopulated regions (such as the island of Minorca). It would be difficult to draw general conclusions about the size of these Mudejar communities (as they were called in Christian Spain), which varied enormously from one region to another. In Castile and León in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Muslim populations were often expelled from the conquered cities.³⁰ Toledo was an exception: Alfonso VI is said to have allowed the Muslims who wished to remain there after the conquest of 1085 to do so, but the vast majority emigrated.³¹ In the Ebro Valley, by contrast, a good number of Muslim peasants stayed after the conquest of the region (Alfonso I of Aragon captured Saragossa in 1118). These Muslims actively participated in the local economy, selling and buying lands and other property; their new Aragonese lords were usually content to live off their seigneurial revenues. Hence the Aragonese saying: “Quien no tiene Moro no tiene oro” (he who has no Moor has no gold).³² During the major Castilian conquests of the thirteenth century, the Muslims from the cities who offered strong resistance were generally expelled, whereas those who negotiated their surrender were granted guarantees allowing them to remain. Some Muslim princes who accepted the suzerainty of the king of Castile had their titles and powers confirmed.³³

In Catalonia, few Muslims remained after the Christian conquest, except in the city of Lérida, where there was a large community until the sixteenth century. The major expeditions of King James I of Aragon added a large number of Muslim subjects to the Crown. During the conquest of Majorca (1229), a good part of the Muslim population, especially the social and economic elite, left the island; only a “headless” Muslim peasantry remained. The Muslims on the neighboring island of Minorca mounted such fierce resistance that the king, when he finally took the island in 1235, reduced the entire population to slavery. In the kingdom of Valencia, a significant Muslim population remained; in many surrender treaties, James guaranteed legal autonomy and religious freedom to the aljamas who recognized his sovereignty.³⁴

There was always the risk that these Muslims would form alliances with potential invaders: Mudejars allied themselves with various Muslim princes from Granada and the Maghreb and revolted against Christian authority. That was especially the case during an uprising orchestrated by two Muslim vassals of Alfonso X of Castile and León, Ibn al- Ahmar, emir of Granada, and Ibn Hud, emir of Murcia, in 1264–1265. (Rebel Christian vassals participated as well.) The Muslim populations revolted in several Andalusian cities, proclaiming their allegiance to Ibn al- Ahmar. They were aided by a contingent of three thousand Moroccan warriors. With some difficulty, Alfonso X succeeded in reasserting his authority and then in expelling the Muslim populations from certain hotbeds of rebellion, especially Jerez and Cadiz. In the region of Denia, which was now part of the kingdom of Valencia, al- Azraq led a major uprising against James I in 1247–1248. James managed to regain control and drove out many Muslims. In 1276, some Mudejars of Valencia revolted to such an extent that the king resolved to expel a good number of them. But his son Alfonso II did not implement that decision.

In the twelfth and especially the thirteenth century, a large number of legal texts came to define the status of Muslims in Christian territory: treaties of capitulation, municipal or royal fueros, ecclesiastical councils. These documents demonstrate that the Muslims from Christian kingdoms could be slaves, free peasants, artisans, or mercenaries in the royal armies. The Muslims’ right to practice their faith was generally guaranteed. Religious conversions had to be voluntary— and only to Christianity, of course. The laws tried to maintain a certain level of segregation: marriage and sexual relations between Muslims and Christians were forbidden, public baths were not to accept Muslims and Christians at the same time, and so on. In theory, the Mudejar was supposed to be socially inferior to the Christian, just as the dhimmi in Islamic countries was inferior to the Muslim. Since the laws concerning the Muslims in Christian lands have been the object of many studies,³⁵ I shall simply give a few examples, by way of

comparison, of the legal provisions introduced to define and circumscribe the place of Muslims in Christian societies.

First of all, the Muslims, like the Jews, were granted the right to practice their religion and to have places of worship. Alfonso X, for example, declared that the Moors could live “observing their law without insulting our own.” Their mosques were royal property; the king could therefore do with them as he pleased. Implicitly, that provision entailed the possibility of turning them into churches, or conversely, of setting some aside to continue to serve as mosques.³⁶ This tolerance tended to erode over time. A good example is the right to perform the adhan, the call to prayer issued by the muezzins, which was often among the concessions granted. In 1311, the Council of Vienne barred the adhan in any Christian territory. But that prohibition was respected in the breach: in Valencia, various fourteenth- and fifteenth-century kings and lords granted exceptions to that ban or declined to enforce it, sometimes drawing the wrath of church authorities.³⁷

Muslim subjects were kept in check by specific legal institutions. In the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem, all Eastern subjects (Christians, Jews, and Muslims) fell under the jurisdiction of the Court of the Fronde, composed of two Frankish magistrates and four Eastern Christians— but no Muslims or Jews.³⁸ Matters of justice within the Muslim community were normally left to the Muslim procurator, the qadi (alcalde in Castilian, alcaide in Portuguese). Some Christian sovereigns guaranteed their Muslim subjects the right to elect their own qadi. Others preferred to name him themselves, but it is likely that, in such cases, the sovereign’s choice was made through negotiations with his Muslim subjects.³⁹

In legal matters involving both Muslims and Christians, it was the Christian justice system (municipal, royal, or other) that prevailed. A Muslim witness sometimes had to swear on the Qur’an, just as the Jew swore on the Torah and the Christian on the Gospels. The *Siete partidas* of Alfonso X of Castile established a precise and elaborate rite: the oath had to be taken at the door of the mosque; the Muslim witness had to swear in the name of Muhammad and his law and had to declare that, if his testimony was not truthful, he agreed to be deprived of all the goods belonging to Muhammad and the prophets and to suffer all the punishments that the Qur’an destined for the infidels.⁴⁰ The court placed more faith in Christian witnesses than in Muslims or Jews: a Muslim could not testify against a Christian, except in cases of treason.⁴¹ Penalties and fines often reflected the Muslim’s inferior status. The *Leyes de estilo*, compiled in Castile in the early fourteenth century, stipulated that the fine for the murder of a Moor should follow local custom but that it had to be lower than that levied for the murder of a Christian.⁴²

The legislation relating to Muslim minorities was derived from the traditional laws that limited the place of Jews in Christian society: in accordance with canon law, Jews could not have the slightest power over Christians. In particular, they were not allowed to own Christian slaves or to hold public office. Later laws extended these principles to the Muslims. The Third Lateran Council (1179) prohibited the Jews and Saracens from owning Christian slaves, a prohibition often repeated in royal legislation (for example, in the *Siete partidas*).⁴³ Various *fueros* in Iberian cities prohibited the Jews and Muslims from being judges in cases relating to Christians.⁴⁴

That legal inferiority did not always translate into true social inferiority. Muslims and Jews could in fact be found at every level of society. Mudejar contingents from Valencia played an important role in the army of the Aragonese kings: during the French invasion of Catalonia in 1285, for example, six hundred Valencian Mudejars, crossbowmen in particular, took part in the defense of Girona. Many Jewish and Muslim doctors were also in the service of princes and commoners. They sometimes provoked jealousy or distrust: William of Tyre complained that the wives of Frankish nobles preferred Jewish or Saracen doctors, and his translator added that these doctors were poisoning the *grandees* of the kingdom.⁴⁵

30. Joseph O'Callaghan, "The Mudejars of Castile and Portugal in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries," in Powell, ed., *Muslims under Latin Rule*, pp. 11–56, esp. 13–18.
31. See Jean- Pierre Molénat, *Campagnes et monts de Tolède du XIe au XVe siècle* (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 1997).
32. See Clay Stalls, *Possessing the Land: Aragon's Expansion into Islam's Ebro Frontier under Alfonso the Battler, 1104–1134* (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 1995); Robert Burns, "Muslims in the Thirteenth- century Realms of Aragon: Interaction and Reaction," in Powell, ed., *Muslims under Latin Rule*, pp. 57–102, esp. 64–67.
33. O'Callaghan, "The Mudejars of Castile and Portugal," pp. 16–18.
34. See Pierre Guichard, *Les musulmans de Valence et la reconquête: XIe–XIIIe siècles*, 2 vols. (Damascus: Institut Français de Damas, 1990–1991); Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, *Els sarraïns de la corona catalano- aragonesa en el segle XIV: Segregació i discriminació* (Barcelona: Consell Superior d'Investigacions Científiques, 1987); Robert Burns, *Islam under the Crusaders: Colonial Survival in the Thirteenth Century Kingdom of Valencia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973); Robert Burns, *Moors and Crusaders in Mediterranean Spain* (London: Variorum, 1978); Robert Burns, *Muslims, Christians, and Jews in the Crusader Kingdom of Valencia* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1984); John Boswell, *The Royal Treasure: Muslim Communities in the Crown of Aragon in the Fourteenth Century* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977); and Mark Meyerson, *The Muslims of Valencia in the Age of Fernando and Isabel: Between Coexistence and Crusade* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
35. Benjamin Kedar, "De Iudeis et Sarracenis: On the Categorization of Muslims in Medieval Canon Law," in *Studia in honorem eminentissimi cardinalis Alphonsi M. Stickler*, ed. R. J. Castillo Lara (Rome: Libreria Ateneo Salesiano, 1992), pp. 207–13; Henri Gilles, "Législation et doctrine canoniques sur les Sarrasins," *Cahiers de Fanjeaux* 18 (1983): 195–213; Emilio Bussi, "La condizione giuridica dei musulmani nel diritto canonico," *Revista di Storia del Diritto Italiano* 8 (1935): 459–94; Peter Herde, "Christians and Saracens at the Time of the Crusades: Some Comments of Contemporary Medieval Canonists," *Studia Gratiana* 12 (1967): 361–76; and Andrea Mariana Navarro, "Imágenes y representaciones de moros y judíos en los fueros de la corona de Castilla (siglos XI–XIII)," *Temas Medievales* 11 (2002–2003): 113–50. See the laws and translations included in the RELMIN database, available at <http://www.cn-telma.fr/remlin/index/> (accessed February 13, 2012).
36. Alfonso el Sabio (Alfonso the Wise), *Las siete partidas* (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1807 and 1972), § 7.25.1. See Tolan, *Saracens*, pp. 174–75, 186–93; Robert Burns, "Jews and Moors in the Siete partidas of Alfonso X the Learned: A Background Perspective," in Collins and Goodman, eds., *Medieval Spain: Culture, Conflict, and Coexistence*, pp. 46–62.
37. Ferrer i Mallol, *Els sarraïns*, pp. 88–94. (note 33)
38. Kedar, "The Subjected Muslims of the Frankish Levant," pp. 154–65. (note 35)
39. Mariana Navarro, "Imágenes y representaciones" (note 35); O'Callaghan, "The Mudejars of Castile and Portugal," p. 37. (note 33)
40. Alfonso el Sabio, *Siete partidas*, § 3.11.21. (note 36)
41. *Ibid.*, § 3.16.8. See also § 3.11.21: "En qué manera deben jurar los moros."
42. O'Callaghan, "The Mudejars of Castile and Portugal," p. 39. (note 33)
43. Lateran III, canon 26, in *Concilia oecumenicorum decreta*, p. 223; canon reiterated in § 10.5.6.5 of *Corpus iuris canonici*, vol. 2: 773; Alfonso el Sabio, *Siete partidas*, § 4.7.8.
44. Mariana Navarro, "Imágenes y representaciones." (note 35)
45. Kedar, "The Subjected Muslims of the Frankish Levant," pp. 159–60. (note 35)

CHAPTER 9: The Islamic-Christian Border in Europe – The Barbary Corsairs

The acquisitions in North Africa of Süleyman the Magnificent and Selim II had made the coasts of Tunis, Algiers, and Tripoli an Ottoman border. This time, the western Mediterranean constituted the buffer zone with the Christian states. As on other borders, local representatives of the central power, from which they were far removed, had a tendency to conduct their own policies, which did not always

coincide with that of the center. But things went farther here than elsewhere: the former provinces became quasi-independent states, though they never completely cut the umbilical cord attaching them to Istanbul. Like the other border regions, the “regencies” had at their disposal a labor force in the “intermediate buffer zone.” This time they were Barbary corsairs.²⁰ Like the other “border men,” these corsairs were unpredictable (opportunity could turn them into common pirates) and their motivations were mixed: they fought in the name of Islam, and it has been noted that the resentment of Muslims, then of the Moriscos driven from Spain, played a role in the growth of privateering and in the trafficking to which it gave rise.²¹ At the same time, privateering and its booty were also their source of revenue, an alternative to regular commerce.²² The corsair captains and their own captains, like the officers of the Maghrebien *ojak*, occasionally rose from the ranks of these “renegades,” whose Islamization generally took place for opportunistic reasons and did not always withstand every test. (But woe to those “Christians of Allah” if they returned to Christendom and fell into the clutches of the Inquisition!) Among the renegades were emancipated slaves, but also, since here again the border served as an escape valve, dissidents of all kinds who had an interest in fleeing Christendom: dissatisfied soldiers or sailors, peasants oppressed by their lords, habitual offenders and other outlaws, merchants in quest of brighter opportunities, and any specialist willing to cash in on his knowledge or expertise. There was no dearth of Venetians, Genoese, Sicilians, Calabrians, Neopolitans, Corsicans, and sometimes even Jews, who would “become Turks” and try their luck in Tunis, Algiers, or Tripoli. In part 1 of his *Don Quixote* (chaps. 39–41), Cervantes recounts that the bey of Algiers, a certain Hasan Pasha, demonstrated his friendship to the author during his captivity in the Barbary port— and that bey was a Dalmatian who had converted to Islam. Another famous example is the man who became bey of Tunis in 1637. The founder of a dynasty, the Muradids, which would rule the regency until the early eighteenth century, he was none other than a Ligurian by the name of Osta Morato. Another celebrated case is that of a Venetian, who would rule Algiers from 1638 to 1645 under the name Ali “Piccinino.” Not all had such good fortune, but many of these renegades had astonishing fates: there was also Orzio Paterno Castello, from a noble family of Catana that he was compelled to leave, having killed his wife in a fit of jealousy. During his escape, he was captured by corsairs from Tripoli, and he converted to Islam, taking the name Ahmad. He would become a dragoman (interpreter) in Tripoli.

Beginning in 1650, the renegades who acquired high positions in the regencies were instead “Ponantines,” seamen from the north, English and Flemish especially. The corsair threat poisoned Mediterranean navigation and had an impact on every nation. It affected populations who were in a position to see “Turks” only during a sea journey, generally to the greater misfortune of the passengers in question. European literature and theater are full of captives taken by the Barbary corsairs, who in an instant reversed people’s best-laid plans and suddenly made the worst outcome seem possible, though not always certain. Molière describes such a fate in *The Bungler*, act 4, scene 7: “In feats of adventure it is common to see / Folks taken by Turkish corsairs at sea.” Victims of the corsair attacks were reduced to slavery. How many destinies were thereby altered! They would toil and wallow in prisons, in convict galleys, or in the service of private individuals. The Christian states strove to redeem them, as did charitable institutions and religious orders that specialized in bargaining with the infidel masters. The most important of these were the Order of the Most Holy Trinity, or Trinitarians, founded in France in 1193 by John of Matha and Felix of Valois, and the Order of Our Lady of Mercy, also called the Mercedarians, which Pedro Nolasco founded in Barcelona in 1203. But the slaves who were redeemed after a more or less prolonged captivity were in the minority. According to the estimate of Emanuel of Aranda, a Flemish gentleman soldier and himself a captive in Algiers, 600,000 Christians died in captivity in Algiers between 1536 and 1640.²³ Considering the Maghrebien slave trade as a whole between 1530 and 1640, a Trinitarian, Father Dan, declared: “It would not be stretching the truth to say that they [the Maghrebis] have put more than a million [Christians] in chains.”²⁴

Algiers was the principal center of the slave trade, but all the cities of the Barbary Coast between Sale and Tripoli participated in it. In the hundred years between 1580 and 1680, there were on average some twenty- seven thousand of these Christian slaves in Algiers (there would be fewer subsequently). At the same time, there were some six thousand in Tunis and perhaps two thousand in Tripoli. The grand total for these estimates nearly corresponds to the figures Father Dan indicates on that somber balance sheet:

As to the slaves of both sexes that are in Barbary today, there are a quantity of them from all the Christian nations, such as France, Italy, Spain, Germany, Flanders, Holland, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Russia, and so forth. The number of these poor captives reaches about thirty- six thousand, according to the enumeration that I have carried out on the spot and to the records that have been furnished and sent to me by the Christian Consuls who live in the Corsair Cities.²⁵

Such a grave phenomenon mortgaged the entire economic and social life of many coastal zones, such as those of Valencia, Andalusia, the Balearic Islands, Campania, and Sicily. But it also poisoned navigation as a whole, in both the western and eastern basins of the Mediterranean. In addition, in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Maghrebis ventured as far as the Atlantic and into the English Channel. They then abducted their captives from off the coast of Cape Finisterre of Galicia, as well as near Belle Isle and Saint Malo, and even on the Banks of Newfoundland, where the French, Portuguese, and English cod fishermen were threatened. Iceland itself was attacked.²⁶

Like all who sailed the Mediterranean, the French were targeted, despite their political alliance with the Great Turk. They thought they could remedy the difficulty by turning to him. Registering complaints with the Sublime Porte about the exactions by Barbary corsairs was a recurring mission of ambassadors to Constantinople. But apart from the fact that the pirates were by nature uncontrollable (like the Cossacks, Tatars, and Uskoks), such measures assumed that the regencies were still altogether an Ottoman frontier, when in fact they had become quasi- independent states. They had to be bargained with or combated directly. That realization came about gradually. By the early seventeenth century, an insidious war took hold between the French fleet and the Maghrebis. Then, to end privateering, France signed treaties with Algiers in 1628 and 1640; with Tunis in 1665; and again with Algiers in 1666. But since the problems persisted, in the 1680s Louis XIV engaged in gunboat diplomacy against the corsair ports: in July 1681, Abraham Duquesne bombarded the roadstead of Chios, where he had pursued Tripolitan vessels. Algiers was shelled in 1682, 1683, and 1688; Tripoli in 1685. After that repressive phase, France signed a whole series of new treaties: in 1684 and 1689 with Algiers; in 1681 and 1685 with Tripoli. The corsairs of Sale were a special case, necessitating a negotiation with the Moroccan sovereign. A French captain, Lefebvre de la Barre, negotiated a first treaty, but Versailles refused to ratify it. An ambassador of Mawlāy Ismā'īl named Temim, governor of Tetouan, had to travel to France before Louis XIV would finally sign a treaty, on February 12, 1682. The baron of Saint- Amans brought the text to Morocco, so that Mawlāy Ismā'īl could ratify it in turn. Nevertheless, French- Moroccan relations rapidly deteriorated. In 1699, a new Moroccan embassy to France, that of Admiral Abdallah Ben- 'Aïcha, attempted to conclude another treaty, but negotiations fell apart.²⁷ The problem posed by the Barbary corsairs persisted into the eighteenth century, and there were further bombings from time to time.

22. The Tunisians finally decided it was time to convert to regular commerce, with the help of the Napoleonic continental blockade of 1806, but the effort ended in failure in 1813 because Westerners did everything they could to neutralize that competition; Daniel Panzac, *Les corsaires barbaresques, la fin d'une épopée, 1800–1820* (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1999).

23. Robert C. Davis, *Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters: White Slavery in the Mediterranean, the Barbary Coast, and Italy 1500–1800* (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 8.

24. Ibid.

25. Pierre Dan, *Histoire de Barbarie et de ses corsaires* (Paris, 1649), p. 284, quoted in Davis, *Christian Slaves*, p. 15.

26. Bartolomé Bennassar and Lucille Bennassar, *Les chrétiens d'Allah* (Paris: Perrin, 1989), pp. 199–200, 244–45.

27. Lucien Bély, *L'art de la paix en Europe: Naissance de la diplomatie moderne, XVIe–XVIIIe siècles* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2007), pp. 347–52. 28. Mehmed Efendi, *paradis des Infidèles: Un ambassadeur ottoman en France sous la Régence*, ed. G. Veinstein (Paris: François Maspéro, 1981), pp. 144–45.